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Abstract—Automated human credibility screening 
is an emerging research area that has potential for 
high impact in fields as diverse as homeland 
security and accounting fraud detection. Systems 
that conduct interviews and make credibility 
judgments can provide objectivity, improved 
accuracy, and greater reliability to credibility 
assessment practices, need to be built. This study 
establishes a foundation for developing automated 
systems for human credibility screening. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Systems that evaluate an individual’s truthfulness 
are proliferating at a faster rate than ever before.  
Two decades ago, the standard polygraph machine 
was the only mainstream “lie detector” technology. 
Today, lie detection systems range from handheld 
devices that measure vocal features to systems that 
involve inserting a person into a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner to view activity in 
the brain.   
Research on deception detection has likewise 
gained in popularity and favorability. Where 
deception detection research was once the purview 
only of cognitive psychology, we now see developed 
streams of deception research from fields ranging 
from communication, behavioral psychology, and 
sociology, to neuroscience, computer science, and 
information systems. 
The drivers behind this growth are clearer now 
than ever before. In a world where insiders leak 
sensitive information, infidelity in relationships is on 
the rise, business scandals destroy billions in wealth, 
and terrorists plot to attack innocent people, systems 
that can effectively judge an individual’s veracity can 
provide value to perhaps every major aspect of our 
lives. 
However, there are several challenges to currently 
used human screening techniques and technologies. 
The most common interviewing protocols do not 
enjoy scientific consensus. Additionally, technologies 
often require a high skill level to operate, techniques 
involve lengthy time requirements, and sensors can 
be invasive. These and similar limitations serve as 
barriers to more widespread application of deception 
detection in practice. Unfortunately, many lie 
detection systems ignore both established research 
and theoretical and protocol limitations in favor of 
expedience. This paper reviews literature related to 
automated deception detection with the goal of 
addressing the research question: How should key 
deception detection theories and protocols inform the 
investigation and development of automated human 
screening systems1?  
The purpose of this study is to review and 
synthesize extant theory, protocols, and technologies 
that can be leveraged to advance automated human 
screening systems. We begin by reviewing the value 
of technology in human veracity screening, followed 
by a review of the principal theories and protocols in 
deception detection research. We describe the 
strengths and weaknesses of each in an automated 
screening system context. Lastly, we review 
technologies that have been or could be leveraged by 
automated human screening systems. 
                                                          
1 For the context of this paper, we define human 
screening system as a unique combination of 
technology, actors, environment, and processes used 
to judge an individual’s veracity.  
 
A. Technology in Deception Detection 
Technology has been used in credibility 
assessment since at least 1895, when Cesare 
Lombroso, an Italian criminologist, used a medical 
device for measuring blood pressure changes during 
police interrogations [1]. In the 1920s and 30s, John 
Larson and Leonarde Keeler developed the now-
widely-known polygraph machine which measures 
blood pressure, respiration, and skin conductance (a 
measure of arousal) [2].  
Recently, additional technologies for human 
screening have been investigated including non-
contact technologies for measuring heart rate and 
blood pressure [3], and automated vocalic [4-6], 
linguistic [7-9], oculometric [10-12], thermal [13, 
14], and kinesic [15, 16] data capture and analysis 
technologies.   
Technology can clearly improve deception 
detection accuracy. Unaided human deception 
detection accuracy rate hovers near chance levels 
[17]. However, when veracity decision makers are 
aided by an effective screening system, accuracy 
improves. There are many ways deception detection 
systems can improve credibility assessment accuracy. 
Table 1 suggests several ways in which systems can 
improve accuracy. 
TABLE 1. HOW SYSTEMS IMPROVE DECEPTION 
DETECTION ACCURACY 
 Tactic for Improving Veracity 
Judgments 
Sample 
References 
1 Detecting and measuring deception 
cues that humans are unable to 
perceive 
[4, 10, 18] 
2 Processing many cues simultaneously  [19] 
3 Conducting complex analyses [10, 19-21] 
4 Increasing test control (e.g., using 
more exact timing, minimizing 
examiner bias)  
[12, 22] 
5 Persuading examiners to better use 
presented relevant information 
[23] 
6 Detecting countermeasures [24-26] 
 
In addition, there are other unexplored ways that 
technology may assist in human screening. Some of 
these include 1) having a virtual agent manipulate 
examinees in a manner that will produce stronger 
deception cues, 2) having a system process the most 
non-problematic people in a rapid screening 
environment automatically, freeing up time for 
screeners to focus on the more questionable subjects, 
3) Providing examiners with insight on which topics 
need deeper probing, and 4) Capturing baseline data 
for use in future screenings. 
II. DECEPTION DETECTION THEORIES 
APPLICABLE TO AUTOMATED SCREENING 
The ability to identify deception is based on the 
premise that the nonverbal and verbal behaviors 
exhibited by truth tellers and deceivers differ. Many 
of these “cues to deception” can be categorized as 
linguistic [27, 28], vocalic [29], kinesic [30], and 
oculometric [31, 32] features.  
Due the prevalence of deception in 
communication, people tend to use heuristics in an 
attempt to identify when deception is occurring; 
however, these heuristics are often inaccurate [32]. 
Furthermore, because of these heuristics, 
communicators attempt to conceal the behaviors that 
they perceive convey deception [32]. Research has 
also suggested that humans have limited cognitive 
capacity, suggesting that a human can only process a 
limited number of tasks simultaneously. When 
committing deception, a person may be fabricating a 
story while attempting to stay relaxed, making eye 
contact with the receiver, and conveying confidence. 
Our belief is that a person may be able to control 
some cues, and may even be highly adept at 
controlling those cues, however, every person has a 
limit to the number of cues that they can control 
simultaneously. Based on prior work [3, 27] we 
estimate that monitoring a set of 15 or more cues 
exceeds the threshold of cognitive ability that would 
be necessary to monitor and control those cues.  
Several theories inform automated credibility 
screening, including Four-Factor Theory (FFT), 
Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), and Orienting 
Response (OR) theory. 
Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal [33] 
developed Four-Factor Theory (FFT) as an extension 
of the leakage hypothesis presented by Ekman and 
Friesen [34]. FFT more closely investigates the 
internal factors that can influence outward displays of 
deception, including: arousal, negative affect, 
cognitive processing, and attempted control. As 
deceivers attempt to control these factors, changes in 
behavior are likely exhibited. Cues of deception 
associated with these internal factors can be 
manifested as behaviors that are stiff, rigid, awkward, 
inexpressive, and lacking in spontaneity [33]. 
Arousal can be detected in lessened movement in the 
extremities [29, 30]. Negative affect can be measured 
by negative emotion word use [28], cognitive 
processing can be measured by preposition use [28], 
and attempted control can be measured by pupil 
dilation or voice pitch [32]. All of these cues can be 
measured using automated sensors. 
Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) [35] 
further subdivides Ekman’s deception cues into 
strategic and nonstrategic behaviors. Strategic cues 
are planned behaviors that occur because the deceiver 
wishes to appear truthful. An example of strategic 
cues would be the messages that the deceiver intends 
to send. Attributes of the message such as length and 
word choice may be used to identify deception, even 
though these messages are crafted consciously by the 
deceiver in an attempt to appear truthful. 
Nonstrategic cues, on the other hand, are 
unintentional behaviors occurring as a byproduct of 
deception. Many of the cues used in automated 
deception detection fall into the category of 
nonstrategic cues. Pupil dilation, changes in the 
voice, and postural shifts are all nonstrategic 
indicators of deception. 
A large part of automated deception detection is 
based upon behavioral research on the orienting 
response [36, 37]. The orienting response is an 
autonomic reaction to a personally relevant stimulus 
[37].  This response is highly relevant with eye 
movement [38]. When there is a visual stimulus, the 
eyes naturally and almost instantly move to the 
stimulus without any cognitive effort. Using this 
theory allows an automated screener to present visual 
stimuli that are more salient for the target individual, 
resulting in measurable changes in gaze behavior that 
can be used to identify recognition. 
Another area of investigation in deception 
detection research is a mechanism we term defensive 
responding. While the OR is thought to be a reaction 
to any novel or personally significant stimulus, 
defensive responding only occurs when that stimuli is 
perceived to be aversive.  
III. DECEPTION DETECTION PROTOCOLS FOR 
AUTOMATED SCREENING 
The most common formalized methods for 
detecting deception include the Control Question 
Technique (CQT) [39], the Behavioral Analysis 
Interview (BAI) [40], and the Concealed Information 
Test (CIT) [41, 42]. Automated screening can mimic 
these interviewing protocols in full, or it can develop 
alternative protocols that may better serve an 
automated screening context.  
There is a benefit to mimicking existing protocols 
or portions of these protocols that have theoretical 
and empirical support. However, there are limitations 
to existing interview protocols. The CQT, while it is 
the most widely used, requires hours to complete. 
The BAI can also require an hour or more. 
Furthermore, both techniques require a high level of 
interviewing skill in terms of manipulating the beliefs 
of the examinee and following up on contextually 
significant details in responses [43]. These skills are 
difficult to effectively mimic. Thus, in deception 
detection contexts, where time and cost are key 
factors, alternative interviewing protocols are likely 
more effective.  
The CIT was developed as an alternative 
approach to conducting criminal interviews [25]. The 
premise of the CIT is that it tests a person’s 
recognition of stimuli that only an individual 
associated with a given crime or incident would be 
aware of. The scientific underpinnings of the CIT are 
grounded in the orienting response [44], which 
results in physiological responses to recognized 
stimuli that will be larger than physiological 
responses to unrecognized stimuli. Individuals with 
no knowledge of a given incident are expected to 
respond to all stimuli randomly. 
Furthermore, the CIT is a promising protocol for 
rapid or secondary screening. It requires virtually no 
skill on the part of the interviewer, enjoys wide 
scientific consensus on validity, and has a simple 
format that can be more easily automated. Though it 
is the least commonly used technique in practice, 
some researchers believe the CIT can and should be 
employed more widely [45].   
IV. NON-INVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR 
AUTOMATED DECEPTION DETECTION 
Important to automated screening research is the 
identification and development of noninvasive means 
to detect deception. Below we discuss the different 
technologies used for gathering information about 
deception without the need for invasive sensors such 
as those used in the polygraph. These technologies 
include automated vocalic, kinesic, oculometric, 
thermal, and linguistic data capture and analysis. 
A. Vocalics 
The voice is a rich source of information. Some 
of the vocal cues important to the automated 
detection of deception are voice quality, pitch, and 
response latency. These three measures are reliable 
indicators of either the stress or cognitive load 
associated with deception. The voice has been 
studied extensively as it relates to the communication 
and understanding of emotion [46, 47].  
Voice quality can be defined as the harmonics-to-
noise ratio present in a given vocal recording [48]. 
Deception research investigating variances in voice 
quality associated with truth and deception suggest 
that liars tend to speak with a lower harmonic-to-
noise ratio than those telling the truth [3]. This 
variance can be attributed to increased cognitive 
effort and the influence of stress and emotion [49]. 
The pitch of the voice, or the fundamental 
frequency at which someone is speaking, is 
controlled by contractions of the larynx in the throat. 
It is closely related to tension, and thus increases in 
stress or nervousness increase the pitch of the 
speaker’s voice [31]. Attributes of a person’s pitch 
that can be used in understanding emotion include the 
average pitch during an utterance, as well as the 
variability in pitch over the length of the utterance 
[46]. 
Typically measured in milliseconds, response 
latency is the length of time between when a question 
is asked and when the person begins to respond. 
Response latency is an important indicator of 
cognitive load [50]. Increased cognitive load is one of 
the theoretical bases for the detection of deception 
[51-53]; we use cognitive load indicated by increased 
response latency as a cue of deception.  
B. Kinesics and Proxemics 
The kinesic and proxemic indicators of deception 
are many and varied. A meta-analysis found some 
support for using lip presses, chin raises, fidgeting, 
illustrators, facial pleasantness, and overall tension 
ratings for differentiating truth from deception [31]. 
However, the effectiveness of these cues appear to be 
moderated by motivation level [31], and is likely 
moderated by culture, context, question type, 
personality, and situational factors. For instance, 
different cultures have different tendencies in 
displaying facial pleasantness, and chin raises during 
a response may have different meanings depending 
on the nature of the question asked.   
Thus, when systems incorporate kinesic cues to 
deception, it is critical that the system include a 
protocol designed to control for or at least minimize 
the effects of moderating factors.  
A more immediate challenge for incorporating 
kinesics into automated screening systems is the 
automation itself. In traditional research into non-
verbal behavior, human judges review video 
recordings of individuals and manually notate each 
movement. To automate this approach, some 
researchers have developed methods of capturing 
body and facial movement by using computer vision 
techniques to track the location of points on the body 
over time.  Abstract variables derived from this 
approach have proven somewhat effective in 
discriminating high from low veracity; however, a 
mapping of these automatically generated cues to 
specific motions and gestures is still needed.  
An alternative but similar approach focused on 
the lack of movement, or rigidity [16]. Rigidity is a 
common correlate of deception, and some evidence 
suggests it may be difficult to control [52]. 
Individuals under conditions of low veracity exhibit 
less overall movement, and the movement that does 
occur appears forced (i.e., movements are shorter in 
duration and have greater velocity) [52, 54, 55]. 
Using computer vision techniques, Twyman 
measured overall movement during a CIT, where no 
communicative movement is present. An overall 
decrease in movement during target items was found 
among deceptive individuals [12]. 
C. Oculometrics 
The eyes offer a rich set of cues for deception. 
Pupil dilation, blinking patterns, and eye movement 
can each be influenced by behavioral and 
physiological correlates of deception. 
Pupil dilation has been shown to be associated 
with deception in many different contexts [56-58]. 
The dilation of the pupil varies not only with changes 
in light, but also with cognitive processing [59], 
memory load [60], orienting reflexes [56-58], and 
attention and effort [61].  
Eye movement is likewise influenced by 
cognitive and affective factors. A number of studies 
have investigated the use of eye gaze fixation points 
to identify familiarity with faces. Ellis and colleagues 
[62] and Althoff and Cohen [63] both explored the 
interpretation of eye gaze fixation patterns on internal 
and external facial features to identify familiarity. 
The results of these studies were orthogonal. Stacey 
and colleagues [64] leveraged a similar approach to 
identifying familiarity, but were similarly unable to 
discriminate between familiar and unfamiliar face 
processing. 
Additional work has been done to tie eye 
movement patterns to deception and concealed 
knowledge. The protocols employed in this initial 
work have included a memory effects testing protocol 
[65], the CQT [11], the CIT [12, 66, 67], and novel 
methods for detecting hidden knowledge [68]. 
D. Linguistics 
There has been much interest in employing 
automated linguistic analysis to deception detection. 
A meta-analysis of linguistic cues revealed that 
response detail, plausibility, logical structure, 
discrepancies, involvement, immediacy, and 
repetitions, as well as spontaneous corrections, 
admissions of lack of memory, and related external 
associations may be useful indicators of deception 
[31]. Some of these cues are still questionable (a 
result of non-homogeneity in surveyed studies), and 
additional cues may be significant, but only during 
certain contexts and under particular circumstances.  
In automated screening, the current state of 
technology is such that not all promising linguistic 
cues can be automatically extracted. For instance, an 
understanding of contextual meaning and situational 
norms is required to determine the plausibility of a 
response. While natural language processing 
techniques are making strides in understanding 
semantics, there is still much work to be done before 
systems will be able to make such a judgment such as 
plausibility with an acceptable level of reliability.  
Some research on automated linguistic analysis 
for deception detection has found support for many 
of the linguistic features identified in DePaulo [31], 
while other research has found additional or in some 
cases conflicting results. For linguistic analysis, it 
may be important to consider whether the response is 
verbal or written, the context of the questioning, and 
the type of questions asked. It seems likely that 
culture and personality factors also play an important 
role. For this reason, results obtained from linguistic 
analysis should be considered in light of these 
factors.  
There are also technology limitations to 
employing automated linguistic analysis to deception 
detection. In a screening scenario, words are usually 
spoken rather than written. Most, if not all, current 
automated transcription technologies require 
calibration to an individual’s voice before an 
acceptable level of automated transcription accuracy 
can be obtained. Such calibration may be a 
reasonable addition to extended screening, but the 
additional time requirement would likely preclude 
application to rapid screening applications. An 
exception might be if individuals are expected to be 
screened often by the same system, such as when 
entering a secure facility regularly for work. In such 
cases, an initial voice calibration process would be 
the only requirement for capturing usable data for 
linguistic analysis. 
E. Cardiorespiratory measures 
Pulse rate, blood pressure, and respiration rate are 
all physiological cues that have been shown to have a 
reliable association with deception [69, 70]. These 
vary with deception because of the increased stress 
and cognitive load associated with the process of 
deceiving and monitoring the interaction. A Laser 
Doppler Vibrometer (LDV) is a device that directs a 
medically safe laser on the neck of a user and is 
capable of reporting the pulse, blood pressure, and 
respiration rate of an individual without the need to 
attach a sensor to the body. Pulse, blood pressure, 
and respiration rate are gathered through the 
measurement of vibrations on the surface of the skin. 
Derrick et al. [71] investigated the use of the LDV 
in uncovering deception and found an accuracy rate 
of 64%, indicating that it is not suitable to be used 
alone. However, in combination with the other 
sensors and cues discussed above, the LDV may be 
able to provide a valuable piece of information in 
discovering deception. Furthermore, the addition of 
cardio-respiratory measures could provide further 
insight into the mental and emotional state of 
interviewees. 
Current LDV technology, however, is not ready 
for a fully automated environment. A few key issues 
identified in [71] are as follows: (1) An operator is 
required to initially aim the laser at the interviewee, 
(2) A clear line of sight to the neck is required, 
meaning that some articles of clothing may impede 
the ability to use this sensor, and (3) only the pulse 
rate can be reported in real-time, while blood 
pressure and respiration are recorded only after post-
processing. When these issues can be addressed, it 
may be advisable to reconsider the LDV for inclusion 
in an automated screening environment. 
Other covert measures of respiration have also 
been investigated for their effectiveness in detecting 
deception [72]. The in-seat and backrest respiration 
sensors used in this experiment were able to measure 
respiratory rates much more subtly than the 
pneumographs used in polygraph interviews, while 
achieving similar levels of accuracy. These sensors, 
though, are limited in that they require the 
interviewee to be seated. However, if the context of 
the automated screening allows for sitting 
participants, such a device would be useful in 
obtaining respiration information unobtrusively. 
F. Thermal measures 
The use of thermal imaging to detect cues of 
deception is a relatively novel area of investigation. 
In this context, thermal imaging is widely used to 
identify increases in regional facial blood flow in the 
orbital areas surrounding the eyes [13, 14]. A number 
of studies have also used thermal imaging to monitor 
temperature changes in the forehead [73, 74]. One 
proposed mechanism triggering these changes is the 
fight or flight response [14]. As a part of this 
response, blood is distributed across the body to 
skeletal muscles [14]. Another proposed trigger is the 
orienting response [37, 75]. 
Contributing to the surge of interest in this area is 
the potential to measure cues of deception 
noninvasively. This is a critical differentiation from 
the widely-used polygraph examination. A 
noninvasive tool will allow thermal data to be 
collected both overtly and covertly [76]. 
Furthermore, changes in blood distribution and 
localized elevated temperature are controlled by the 
sympathetic nervous system, thus, this autonomic  
response is likely resistant to countermeasures [77].  
Research evaluating the accuracy rate of thermal-
based deception detection is promising. Pavlidis [13] 
and colleagues conducted a mock-crime experiment 
during which subjects assaulted and stole money 
from a dummy. Using thermal imaging data to 
discriminate between guilty and innocent subjects 
yielded a classification accuracy rate of 83%. A 
different study tested both startle and mock-crime 
experiments and reported a classification accuracy 
rate of 87.2% [78]. Finally, Zhu and colleagues [74] 
examined the accuracy rate of thermal imaging by 
monitoring the corrugator muscle in the forehead, 
and reported a classification accuracy rate of 76.3%. 
Despite the promising findings in each of these 
studies, others argue that thermal imaging is not 
feasible for rapid screening. 
Vrij [79] points out a number of obstacles. First, 
the assumption is made that all deceivers will 
demonstrate stress cues, which may be prevalent but 
not ubiquitous. Second, there is a limited corpus of 
research investigating the types of interviewing 
techniques that would prove useful for rapid 
screening. Third, accuracy rates close to 90% in the 
lab are promising, but a 10% inaccuracy rate would 
result in an alarming number of false positives in a 
field setting.  
Despite these criticisms, future research is needed 
to determine if using thermal imaging is a viable tool 
to identify cues of deception and recognition, 
especially when used in conjunction with other 
sensors. 
V. INVASIVE MEASURES FOR DETECTING 
DECEPTION 
Although our emphasis has been on noninvasive 
methods for detecting deception, advances in 
cognitive neuroscience have led to investigations 
using more invasive technologies such as fMRI and   
electroencephalograms (EEGs) that measure brain 
functioning during deceptive responding, states of 
high stress or cognitive overload [e.g., 18, 80-83]. 
The fMRI measures brain activity from changes in 
blood flow in regions of the brain. The EEG 
measures electrical activity and event-related 
potentials such as responses to “oddball” stimuli. 
These technologies, which are cumbersome, 
expensive, and time-consuming to implement, are not 
feasible for rapid screening but can be used to cross-
validate other noninvasive approaches. For example, 
they can demonstrate whether the “executive” region 
of the brain in the prefrontal cortex becomes engaged 
during a deceptive narrative or whether novel stimuli 
presented during a CIT alter brain wave patterns, thus 
providing insights into how the brain produces and 
processes deception.  
VI. OUR APPROACH 
To address the need for automated human 
credibility screening without sacrificing scientific 
rigor, we have begun a stream of research on 
automated human screening using a kiosk-based 
approach. We have generally relied on a design 
science approach, which focuses on building and 
evaluating new IT artifacts to extend knowledge [84]. 
The first phase of our approach was identifying 
sensors that could collect cues of deception and 
concealed knowledge in a rapid, non-invasive 
screening context. A variety of experimental tasks 
have been used to test and calibrate the sensors, 
including: mock-crime experiments, simulated 
screening experiments, and automated screening 
interviews using embodied agents. More than 2000 
subjects have participated in these studies. 
A first-generation kiosk was created with the 
intention to demonstrate a proof-of-concept. It served 
as a framework for testing sensors and incorporating 
the first attempt at using an embodied agent to 
conduct automated interviews. Its dynamic design 
allowed ease in adding, removing and calibrating 
sensors. 
A second iteration, termed the Automated Virtual 
Agent for Truth Assessments in Real Time 
(AVATAR) was designed to incorporate additional 
sensors and other features relevant to deployment in 
the field, including a biometric fingerprint scanner, 
an RFID passport reader, and a magnetic strip reader 
for processing fees [3]. To collect data to improve 
future designs of the AVATAR, a field test at a U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) office in 
Nogales, Arizona was conducted, and data from that 
field test is currently being analyzed.  
To facilitate iterative kiosk design, building, and 
experimentation, we also developed an Automated 
Screening Kiosk (ASK) that is modular and easily 
changeable. The ASK has already been successfully 
used in several experiments utilizing a CIT paradigm  
[12].  
VII. CURRENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS 
Because this is a new area of research, there are 
many challenges to be addressed. These challenges 
range from experimental considerations to ensure 
validity to policy considerations to ensure 
compliance with law. A sampling of these challenges 
is listed in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2. AUTOMATED CREDIBILITY SCREENING SYSTEM RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
 
Challenge Challenge Description 
1 Ensuring Realism in Experimental 
Research 
Since credibility cues are linked to cognitive and behavioral reactions to real-world theoretical 
constructs, it is important to replicate those theoretical constructs realistically in the laboratory or 
results will not generalize. 
2 Integrating System and Human 
Judgment 
In many scenarios, a credibility system judgment will inform or otherwise be merged with a human 
judgment. There is some evidence of potential for loss of effectiveness as a result. How can the 
correct outcome be best assured in these situations? 
3 Minimizing or Controlling for 
Environmental Factors 
While many credibility assessments usually occur in a closed room with few distractions, those that 
occur as part of a job interview, forensic accounting interview, or rapid screening interview may 
take place in a noisy environment that could affect sensors, responses, and interactions.  
4 Minimizing or Controlling for 
Cultural or Personality Factors 
In few cases will a physiological or behavioral response be culture or personality agnostic. Further 
research needs to discover how relevant cultural norms and personality traits affect cues to deception 
in various contexts. 
5 Detecting or Minimizing the 
Effectiveness of Countermeasures 
Countermeasures are methods examinees employ to try and trick a credibility assessment into 
generating a truthful judgment. Countermeasures has long been an important area of research in 
deception detection, but new methods and measures introduce additional complexities. 
6 Increasing Accuracy of 
Automated Transcription 
Linguistic measures of deception show great promise, but in many credibility assessment contexts 
only verbal responses are recorded, or typed or written responses are not feasible. In such cases, 
automated transcription will be necessary to take advantage of these linguistic cues. Automatic 
transcription increases in difficulty when no training set is available or possible to obtain or when 
background noise is present. 
7 Adjusting Models for Different 
Base Rates 
Most experimental research in deception detection uses a parametric design. However, real-world 
applications may have much different positive rates, and models will need to be adjusted to account 
for these differences.  
8 Designing Effective Protocols for 
Field Experiments 
A major challenge with field experiments is establishing ground truth. That is, it is difficult to 
determine actual credibility a priori or ex post facto, so that system judgments can be compared to 
known fact. Effective field experimental protocols will need to obtain ground truth or be able to 
effectively estimate it. 
9 Visualizing System Output for 
Decision Support 
Automated Credibility Screening Systems have the potential to produce a large amount of input for 
decision makers. How to best present this information to decision makers and managers is an open 
question for future research. 
10 Integrating so as to decrease, 
rather than increase decision time 
A key goal of most automated credibility systems is to reduce manual labor. Especially in rapid 
screening contexts, systems will need to be designed such that throughput will at least not decrease, 
but potentially increase through fully automated processing of the least risky examinees. 
11 Adapting to account for 
Psychological Deficiencies 
How psychological deficiencies such as psychopathy may affect automated credibility assessment 
systems is an open research question. Related research suggests that it is an important area to 
address. 
12 Ensuring Proper Training for 
Different Types of Users 
Some decision makers such as rapid screening officers will be interacting with these systems on a 
regular basis, while others such as small business hiring committees will use them infrequently. 
There is a risk of improper use or disuse among users of different personality types and dispositions. 
How should training be adapted for each context?  
13 Addressing Corporate and 
Municipal Policy Concerns 
Privacy is an important concern. The United States Supreme Court has forbidden the use of the 
standard polygraph to screen applicants, except for government positions. What will be the 
challenges to public acceptance of this new technology, and how can these challenges be addressed 
while ensuring privacy and security of personal data? 
 
While the challenges are complex and diverse, 
they can be used to help guide future research. First, 
the accuracy rates of technologies used to identify 
cues of deception and concealed knowledge must be 
tested, and ultimately improved, by conducting 
laboratory experiments promoting realism and 
generalizability. This will require additional research 
testing the sensors discussed in this paper, as well as 
identifying new sensors that are feasible and relevant 
for rapid, noninvasive credibility assessments. 
Second, the realism and dynamism of embodied 
agents used to conduct the automated interviews must 
be improved. As embodied agents become more 
effective, they can be used more efficiently to elicit 
information, foster trust and credibility, and 
ultimately, improve the accuracy of the system as a 
whole. Third, prior research suggests that users of 
decision support systems often disregard the 
recommendations provided to them. Thus, additional 
research is needed to investigate the way in which 
such systems could foster credibility with end users, 
and ultimately, provide value to the organization. 
Fourth, transitioning such a system from 
development to use in the field will require additional 
considerations regarding information privacy, 
securing data compiled by sensors, and overcoming 
obstacles imposed by government and municipal 
policies that may hinder implementation. 
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
There are many potential applications for 
technologies that can conduct automated credibility 
assessments. In light of this, a variety of research 
streams continue to be investigated, including 
identifying and testing sensors to identify deception 
and concealed knowledge, improving data fusion and 
analysis techniques, and creating embodied agents to 
conduct automated interviews. Combining the 
findings from these diverse areas of exploration will 
result in robust platforms that can more accurately 
assess credibility. 
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